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INTRODUCTION
The principal argument that has been developed in many countries for sup-
porting important government activities in the arena of Science and
Technology (S&T) emerges from notions of « market failure » – left to them-
selves, markets would not allocate sufficient resources to the advancement of
S&T from an economic and social point of view.
More precisely, an extensive literature in economics that dates back at least
to the classic studies by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), later refined by the
« new growth » theorists like Romer (1986, 1990, 1994), has contended that
markets will under-invest in R&D when there is : a) incomplete appropriabili-
ty (« non-excludability ») – that is, firms cannot keep all the benefits of their
research to themselves, as knowledge leaks out to others ; b) non-depletability
(« non-rivalry ») – i.e. the results of R&D can be used by others without incur-
ring real resource costs. However, in practice, the costs of imitation may be
much higher than implied by the new growth theorists, casting doubt on the
free-lunch nature of any technological « spillovers ».
Section 1 of this paper begins by looking at how the case for government
intervention via technology policy in the UK in the later 20th century was typi-
cally justified by « market failure » arguments, and goes on in more analytical
vein to contrast these with a view that would play up non-market sources of
failure. Section 2 summarises some of my earlier work in the economic histo-
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ry of the postwar UK (von Tunzelmann, 2003), here updated, to contend that
an analysis of technology trends indicates that non-market failures, mainly
systemic and dynamic in nature, were a more basic source of British techno-
logical shortcomings in this period (and probably in most other leading coun-
tries of the time). In section 3, analysis of the trends in technology policy sug-
gests that narrowly economics-based views too often hampered good inten-
tions to reform policy along more appropriate lines, and restricted develop-
ment of adequate capabilities for « policy learning ». Section 4 consists of a
discussion of policy learning in a context of network misalignment and syste-
mic failure, while section 5 draws some conclusions intended to achieve more
satisfactory policy designs. The core analytical perspective adopted throu-
ghout the paper can be seen as representing an application of the Richardson-
Sen model(s) of capabilities and networking to the government/policy-making
field (cf. Richardson, 1972, 2008 ; Sen, 1985).
I. — MARKET FAILURES VERSUS NON-MARKET FAILURES
According to Barber and White (1987), the chief forms of « market failure »
invoked by policy-makers in the UK government department responsible in
the mid-1980s for technology policy – the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) – were as follows :
i) Risk – firms were too often risk-averse to carry out R&D projects, even
when they stood a good chance of succeeding ;
ii) Information – asymmetries of access to relevant technological informa-
tion existed, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) ;
iii) Competition and market structure meant that high R&D costs often acted
as entry barriers against newer entrants ;
iv) Externalities – especially the non-appropriable benefits from spillovers to
competitors ;
v) « Dynamic » elements, as these writers term them – particularly secular
changes such as « infant industry » and « infant technology » situations.
Barber and White stress that such a list was incomplete from a theoretical
viewpoint, and indeed that policy-makers did little to interact with economic
theory (it should be noted that John Barber was at the time and until his recent
retirement employed by the DTI). But how appropriate was contemporary
theory in any case to the growing emphasis in policy (and practice) of colla-
borative research/R&D (a pattern to be described below)?
The principal claim made in this paper is that many of the « failures » that
have been in operation in the actual British context in the postwar years have
been « non-market failures » rather than the above (or more extended) list of
market failures, and in addition that many of the presumed market failures as
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diagnosed in reality concealed deeper « non-market failures ». Hence our first
task is to attempt a categorization of « non-market failures », whose character
might appear less immediately apparent. To do so, failures as well as « suc-
cesses » can be related to each main type of governance mode. For present pur-
poses, the economical definition of « governance » provided by Prakash and
Hart (1999) is taken as adequate – governance is « organizing collective
action ».
The literature seems to recognise four main modes of governance, namely
markets, hierarchies – of two kinds, corporate and government – and networks
(e.g. Thompson et al., 1991). For present purposes, I define « networks » in a
residual and somewhat negative way, namely all interactions between or
among agents that do not involve power relations or market exchanges. To
each mode there corresponds a particular form of failure, and both the mode
and its negation in the associated form of failure is frequently classified as a
kind of « hand », in tribute to Adam Smith’s « invisible hand » to describe the
market mode (see table 1).
The broad category of « non-market failures » thus encompasses failures that
are hierarchical (both corporate and government, i.e. in both the private and
public sectors) or networked in form. Most of our attention in what follows
will in fact be directed at the « network failures », partly because these are the
least familiar in the literature, but more because they often in practice encap-
sulate aspects of all the other forms of failure. The nature of networks and of
the associated « network failure » will be examined at some length below.
Since the concept of « non-market failure » may seem somewhat abstract,
Table 2 provides a list of a handful of illustrative examples. The forms of fai-
TABLE 1 : Modes of governance and forms of failure
Governance mode Form of failure
Markets Invisible hand Market failure Trembling hand
Hierarchies – corporate Visible hand Corporate failure
Hierarchies – government Government failure Grabbing hand
Networks Greeting hand Network failure Shaking hand
TABLE 2 : Specific (individual) vs. systemic failures
Governance mode Specific failures (examples) Systemic failures (examples)
Market Product under/over-supply Shortage economy
Corporate Company bankruptcy Poor organizational systems
Government Corrupt ministers Central planning
Network Too few/many members Network misalignment
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lure in each mode are divided into « specific » (individual) cases, of a failure
in one market (etc.), as against « systemic failures », consisting of failures in
multiple (or all) markets (etc.). « Network failures » are often identified with
« systemic failures », but we consider that there is merit in conceptually dis-
tinguishing the two, with network failures constituting a row item in this table,
while systemic failures are a column item, with instances that can be associa-
ted with each mode of governance (the table follows a similar one given in
Larsen and von Tunzelmann, 2008, except that in the English-language ver-
sion of that paper we referred to specific failures as « intrinsic »).
Thus for the orthodox market mode of governance, an under-supply or else
an over-supply of a product in a particular market, relative to demand (given
the prevailing price) – say in the market for petroleum – constitutes a « speci-
fic failure ». The macro version of this could be the « shortage economy » as
described by Kornai (1980) for the Central and Eastern European economies
in the communist era, reflecting a generalised absence of goods on the shelves
of shops in the « marketplace ». However in both cases one would expect the
duration of such disequilibria to be short owing to the presumed operation of
conventional Walrasian price dynamics (1) – unless the disequilibrium is
underpinned by political (i.e. governmental) or other (e.g. monopolistic corpo-
rate) forces arising out of other forms of « failure ». As will be seen in a
moment, this is precisely the point to drive home here. Other forms of market
failure that are less open to Walrasian pressures would include problems ari-
sing out of the potential for confusion between the « low quality » and « good
bargain » signals of low prices, as in the celebrated Akerlof (1970) model of
the market for « lemons » (poor quality automobiles), and the general Arrow-
Debreu problem of the absence in reality of the full set of contingent and futu-
re markets required for the invisible hand property to function.
For the other modes of governance, the distinction between specific (intrin-
sic) and systemic failures can be built up in parallel fashion. Thus corporate
failure can be regarded as the failure of individual companies (say Enron or
Lehman Brothers) at a specific level, or a more generalised inability to attend
to corporate structures (as for instance Chandler et al., 1999, allege of British
companies being slow to embrace multidivisional organisation in the first half
of the 20th century – see section 2.4 below) at a systemic level. Similarly
government failures can arise from corruption in a particular ministry (speci-
fic), or more widespread weaknesses of the political system (as for example
under Soviet-style central planning – systemic). In both cases there may be
intermediate situations of chain reactions of failure that spread across a num-
ber of corporations or government departments, while stopping short of gene-
ral (fully systemic) failure ; in which case network issues might well have ari-
sen. The examples of specific network failure chosen for illustration in the
(1) I owe an emphasis on this point to remarks by Richard Arena at the workshop.
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table, however, concern situations where the network consists of too few mem-
bers (lacking « density »), or perhaps too many to operate effectively. The sys-
temic case of « network alignment » will be entertained below. Roughly spea-
king, « specific failures » correspond to the economic context of « partial dise-
quilibrium », whereas « systemic failures » correspond to « general disequili-
brium » ; though with the source of disequilibrium varying depending on the
agent involved (corporation, etc.).
It needs to be stressed that, in practice, few if any significant real-world
situations reflect a unique mode of governance, but our theoretical models for
dealing with complexity in governance (like conjoined corporate and govern-
ment modes or forms of failure) are practically non-existent. This is most evi-
dent for the case of networks, few of which in reality do not involve additio-
nal elements of power relations or of monetary exchange, though not necessa-
rily all at the same time.
All of us are involved in multiple networks, as a measure of the complexity
we face – networks of academic disciplines, of work-based organizations, of
policy-makers, of kinship, etc. We can thus think of « networks of networks »,
for each individual agent – and individuals come together to form organiza-
tions and institutions, as compound agents. Just like other forms of governan-
ce, networks are subject to « failure » (as in table 2), and these network fai-
lures can involve :
a) a required network being missing or very ineffective (specific failure, as
studied in much « social network analysis ») ;
b) an existing set of networks that pursue antisocial targets (systemic failure
in goals) ;
c) an existing set of networks that pursue socially acceptable targets but in
inconsistent ways (systemic failure in instruments).
Of these, the third type is the most elusive but probably the most important.
They generate issues that are being studied by the « network alignment »
approach. Thus in my Revue d’Économie Industrielle paper of 2004, I paid
particular attention to the mismatch between the EU’s macroeconomic policy,
as a restrictive set of policies under the flag of the Stability and Growth Pact
and the associated Maastricht criteria, and its technology policy, as a set of
expansionist policies grouped around the Lisbon Agenda of 2000 and the asso-
ciated Barcelona target of raising the rate of GERD intensity to 3 % of natio-
nal income. While two-thirds of the supposed 3 % target was supposed to
come – somehow – from the private sector, it was, and still remains, difficult
to see how such an expansionary rise in R&D could come about in a constric-
tive macroeconomic environment. To account for the network dimensions of
this issue however requires some further consideration be given to the nature
of the relevant « system ».
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The kinds of systems that are indeed relevant here are the « techno-econo-
mic systems » portrayed by Freeman and colleagues (e.g. Freeman and Perez,
1988 ; Lee and von Tunzelmann, 2005). The evolution of such techno-econo-
mic systems over the longer term has been driven by :
a) technical drivers on the supply side ;
b) economic drivers on the demand side ;
c) the interfaces between the technical and economic drivers ; and
d) cross-currents of « complexity », that are i) spatial, especially globaliza-
tion, ii) functional, especially new technologies.
Networks are offered as a generic solution to the emerging problems of such
complexity, because they enable appropriate linkages to be made, especially
where the context of « networks of networks » can thrive. « Pure » networks,
involving as already stated interchanges among agents that do not (principal-
ly) concern power or market relations, arise most often in situations of
exchanges of knowledge. This occurs because of the combinatorial properties
of much knowledge (i.e. joining rather than supplanting, or complementary
rather than competitive), together with the difficulties of valuing knowledge in
markets.
The network alignment approach accepts this « solution » to many contexts
of complexity, but does not find it unproblematic. Among the problems that the
resort to networks throws up are the following (this list is by no means exhaus-
tive) :
a) practical problems of managing and organizing networks – contrary to
much of the literature such networks do not simply organize and manage them-
selves, and the absence of a hierarchical or market mode of governance actual-
ly intensifies the problems to be dealt with, especially in the common context
of « networks of networks », where a given network organizer is likely to be
managing one or two of the relevant networks while being managed in regard
to the others. Building the trust and reciprocity normally required in a situa-
tion where overt power relations are ostensibly limited or non-existent calls for
the exercise of tact, care and wisdom. Nevertheless the concern in this paper
is with more analytical issues, which in part are responsible for the problems
of managing networks ;
b) measuring knowledge, as the likely content of what the network inter-
changes – there are well-known limitations of the data extracted from such
sources as innovation surveys, patents, R&D, or skills as guides to assessing
the effectiveness of the networks in question ; to say nothing of the problems
involved in trying to gauge tacit knowledge, absorptive capacity, etc.
(Giuliani, 2007) ;
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c) assessing the network goals (targets) immediately runs into problems of
overlapping and often conflicting goals for each agent in the network ; for ins-
tance for firms (where the goals may be variously market-seeking, cost-see-
king, or knowledge-seeking), for universities and other higher education insti-
tutes (goals may be to expand research, teaching, or revenues, say via IPRs
etc.), for governments (political goals of a regulatory, developmental, or dis-
tributive nature), and so on. Problems of making these compatible in multi-
agent networks are of course often very serious ;
d) measuring network capabilities – matching « network structures » and
knowledge structures (the instruments to achieve such conflicting goals, for
knowledge creation, dissemination or interaction, e.g. through bridging insti-
tutions). Again the problems accumulate in multi-agent environments, e.g. for
the higher education sector, which is expected to supply science and technolo-
gy to firms but also some policy advice to governments ;
e) assessing the dynamics of knowledge accumulation – attaining the dyna-
mic economies of scale and scope (increasing returns) involved in recompen-
sing the system for the burdens imposed by networking. These are likely to
involve time-saving and space-saving effects (issues of « when » and
« where », to add to the usual list of « what », « how », « who » and « why »).
The complete attainment of « network alignment » is an improbability, given
the multiplicity of goals, instruments, agents and networks involved. It is quite
likely to be undesirable to reach any such optimum, because the costs of stri-
ving for perfection at the margin may well exceed the benefits. Nevertheless,
at the heavily infra-marginal level at which most existing network structures
probably operate, there is often much to be said in favour of aiming to do bet-
ter – rather than achieving « best practice » I would thus follow evolutionary
thinking in advocating the objective of « better practice ».
It is time to confront these analytical propositions with the achievements and
shortcomings of technology policy in the UK in the second half of the 20th cen-
tury.
II. — THE POSTWAR UK RECORD IN TECHNOLOGY
PERFORMANCE
2.1. Introduction
The most evident change in governance over the period – in the UK as in
many other leading countries – was the shift in its main thrust from being pri-
marily government-led in the 1950s and 1960s to being primarily market-led
in the 1970s and especially 1980s. Although the 1980s was associated with the
pro-market Thatcher regime, these patterns were shared by both Labour and
Conservative administrations. These were followed in turn by a more mixed
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set of views giving greater emphasis to collaboration in the 1990s, with decen-
tralization in the most recent decade, reversing the somewhat inconsistent
Thatcher trend towards increased centralization.
The major shift of emphasis in 1970s/80s implied that government techno-
logy projects then had to justify themselves using « market-failure » or at least
« market-friendly » criteria. This went alongside a rather curious loss of popu-
lar faith in the properties of technology to redeem growth performance, which
arose (at least in part) for the following reasons :
i) a continuing loss of British competitiveness in 1960s/70s in what were
regarded as technology-based industries ;
ii) a sequence of public relations disasters, e.g. nuclear power, and later BSE
(« mad cow disease »), for which the government was perhaps only partly to
blame (Henderson, 1977 ; van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2005) ;
iii) many high-tech companies turned into financial flops, i.e. became speci-
fic corporate failures, particularly as the dot.com bubble burst in the early
years of the present century, though with a considerable number of predeces-
sors, like ICL in computers.
The correspondence between such loss of public respect for technology and
an intensified desire by the UK government to obtain « market-friendly » out-
comes led to a partial withdrawal of government support for technological
objectives, after a high-water mark in the early 1980s. The consequences will
be expanded on below, after giving some brief attention to the UK’s track
record in technological performance.
2.2. Biases in technological change
The main emphasis in the 1950s/60s was laid on capital-embodied technical
progress, partly as a matter of reconstruction after the Second World War, but
relying principally on the heavy and chemical industries of the preceding
« Second Industrial Revolution » (coal-based electrification, steel, automo-
biles, heavy engineering, bulk chemicals, etc.). The focus for government sup-
port (either direct or indirect) thus lay on large capital-intensive firms like
GEC or ICI, and in particular to support their efforts towards monopolization
of their respective industries. At the meso-level, the focus on the consolidation
of capital-intensive industries was intended to produce « national champions ».
This phase coincided with an era of rising capital expenditure as a proportion
of GDP, not just in the UK but across Western Europe more generally (for data
and graphs, see von Tunzelmann, 1999 : 28). However the competition in such
sectors spread across continents, with the rising « tigers » of Japan and a little
later South Korea also targeting the heavy and chemical industries at this time.
Moreover growing integration among the economies of Western Europe began
to make the strategy of « national champions » look obsolete.
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010 245
Government policy, still framed largely in a national context, was slow to
perceive any change of emphasis. It moved a little quicker into the newly
emerging sectors like those based around IT, yet still for the most part retai-
ning an assumption of the need for capital intensity and nationalistic fervour.
In practice, the rising intensity of gross capital formation that persisted until
about 1973 (2) gave way to a period in which investment rates fell. This fall in
physical capital formation was partly offset by rising investment in R&D,
although the measures used for the latter (Frascati Manual definitions) redu-
ced its magnitude, as compared with some broader notion of « intellectual
capital ».
Associated with the shift from physical to intellectual capital was a shift in
technological bias from to « embodied » to « disembodied » technical change,
i.e. to technical change that was not so much embodied in capital equipment
(machinery etc.), although more « embodied » in people. This aspect too was
only slowly reflected in changes in government policy. « Embodiment » in
people rather than in capital was epitomised by the expansion of software
development, constituting a rising share of total investment in information and
communication technologies (ICTs), though for long the emerging « Third
Industrial Revolution » was identified with the hardware aspects of technolo-
gy, especially of the electronics industry. In terms of products rather than tech-
nologies, the « information » content of ICTs was largely identified with
« knowledge » – grossly oversimplifying the processes of technological and
market learning.
2.3. S&T performance and funding
The data available for the UK from the end of World War II to about the mid-
1990s are collected and graphed in von Tunzelmann (2003), and the present
summary will just survey and update these figures where necessary.
2.3.1. R&D performance – GERD, BERD and HERD
Figures on R&D expenditures have become the most widely cited of natio-
nal indicators pertaining to technological performance. The attempt to
construct a narrow consensual definition through the OECD’s Frascati Manual
means that much developmental work aimed at the commercialisation of inno-
vations is left out of the figure for R&D. It is widely believed that the UK is
stronger at « upstream » science and technology than at « downstream » adop-
tion and diffusion, so if anything UK expenditures tend to overstate its relati-
ve international performance in technology. Figures of « R&D intensity », i.e.
GERD (Gross Expenditure on R&D) relative to the country’s GDP, suggest a
rapid build-up to a plateau of around 2.3 % from the late 1950s to the early
(2) For the more developed European countries the average capital intensity reached a plateau
through most of the 1960s, before heading more sharply downwards after 1973.
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90s, followed by some decline in the early 1990s. These figures suggest the
UK as at best holding its level of R&D intensity, though failing to match the
longer-term rises experienced in comparable European economies like France
and (West) Germany. Over the decade from 1995 to 2004, the average R&D
intensity in the UK had fallen to about 1.8 %, compared with 2.2 % in France,
2.4 % in Germany and 2.6 % in the USA (figures from UK ONS database (3)). 
In terms of BERD, i.e. business expenditure on R&D, in the long run there
is again basic stability – from the late 60s through to the late 80s BERD sticks
at about 1.5 % of GDP, before declining in the 90s, notwithstanding the 
(part-)privatization of many government laboratories like the Atomic Energy
Authority. Again, the UK did relatively badly compared with its international
rivals.
For the case of HERD as a percentage of GDP the story is very different –
here a positive performance by the UK not only features but almost dominates
the picture. Until the cuts in university funding at the end of the 70s the contri-
bution of UK higher education institutions to the country’s R&D was well
below that in comparable countries. The cuts and the associated reorientation
of university research towards applied objectives in order to secure non-
governmental funding more than doubled the HERD contribution to UK GDP
during the 80s. By the mid-80s the UK ratios were in the same ball-park as its
rivals, and by the mid-90s there was strong convergence among the major
countries. It can reasonably be claimed that the UK was successful in steering
its universities into industrially relevant research. As of 2006, R&D performed
by higher education (including the research councils) in the UK was half of
that performed by the entire business sector (BERD), whereas in 1996 it had
been little over one third as much (ONS data).
Thus the pattern observed for the UK is rather different from most indus-
trially advanced countries – instead of a slowdown in government R&D
expenditure being more than offset by rising business expenditure, the UK wit-
nessed a slowdown in business R&D expenditure, perhaps even a fall, and a
rise in higher education R&D that was offset by a fall in government expendi-
ture in other domains.
2.3.2. R&D funding
These figures on expenditures, reflecting amounts performed by the respec-
tive agents, must be clearly differentiated from the sources of funding. In most
countries, and the UK is no exception, the government funds considerably
more R&D than it performs. For instance, industrial funding was under one-
quarter of total R&D in the mid-50s, but industry still did most of the perfor-
ming (Gummett, 1991). In 1996 private business in the UK funded about 47 %
(3) Office of National Statistics.
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of total domestic R&D but performed about 75 % (Diederen et al., 1999). By
2006, the respective proportions were 45 % and 62 % (ONS data). In the UK
most of this « subsidy » to industry has reflected military R&D, where the
government contracts out a substantial portion of defence-related R&D.
Large changes occurred during the 1980s and early 90s. At the beginning of
the 1980s government funded around half of the total R&D performed in the
country, but from 1983 this share dropped away (Georghiou, 2001). Industry’s
share rose from just over 40 % in 1981 to a maximum about 10 points higher
in 1988. Some part of the falling government share was compensated by a
rising share funded by foreign sources, i.e. by increasing reliance on foreign-
based multinational companies, and by other national sources (e.g. charities),
especially after 1988. Charities were especially important in funding basic
scientific research.
Overall the experiment of cutting UK government spending on R&D in the
hope of boosting private R&D can hardly be judged a success. The growth in
the UK R&D stock was the slowest of the G6 countries 1972/89 and especial-
ly in 1990/4 (Buxton et al., 1998 : 172).
2.3.3. Patenting
Patent figures are regularly, though sometimes inadvisably, used as a mea-
sure of the output of technology. Most scholars are prepared to use them to
gauge trends through time, if used with due care. The data for patents in the
USA, chosen because it is the largest world market, relative to other advanced
countries apart from the US, show UK patenting as declining in most periods
from the 1880s onwards (when the data begin), except for the interwar period
(Pavitt, 1980 : 38-44). After World War II the US patents data show Germany
with a sustained increase almost throughout in per capita terms, reaching its
peak just before German reunification in 1990. Having overtaken the UK in
the late 1950s, at its peak the German level was about two and a half times that
of the UK. France shows a slower rate of increase but still caught the UK by
the early 1980s and rose somewhat above in the early 90s. The UK instead
shows only a very slow trend increase in US patents per capita, reaching its
peak in the early 1970s. All of these patterns are in fact dwarfed by Japan,
which had dramatic rates of growth of US patenting over these years.
Alternative series are available for patenting at the European Patent Office
(EPO) from the early 1980s. For the most recent years for which data are avai-
lable (1995-2003) the average annual number granted to UK patentees was
112 (per million capita), compared with 127 for France, 149 for the USA, and
266 for Germany. Though this figure rose by 49 % between 1995 and 2003 for
the UK, the percentage increases were somewhat greater for these three com-
parator countries (ONS data). To the extent that patents do provide some indi-
cation of technological « output », the data give little comfort to the view of a
strong UK performance.
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2.3.4. Science – publications and citations
As a guide to the underlying strength of technology, the growth of the scien-
ce base is an obvious pointer. Using data from the Science Citations Index for
1981/2000, the UK shares of both papers and citations thereto remain at res-
pectably high levels, despite the global spread of science.
Overall, the numbers of publications when compared to the material covered
above appear to indicate a much healthier state of British science than of
British technology throughout the periods for which we have reasonable data.
A government report in 1997 showed the UK carrying out 5.5 % of the total
world’s research effort, producing 8.0 % of the world’s publications and 9.1 %
of all citations (May, 1997 ; Diederen et al., 1999). The Office of Science &
Technology thus showed a high « productivity » of British science in terms of
papers per amount spent on science, although it can be doubted whether like
was being compared with like. Even if valid, to many this simply reflected the
low amounts spent in the denominator rather than the high outputs achieved in
the numerator of the productivity calculation (Georghiou, 2001). The data do
at the same time make the government attempts in the 1980s and early 90s to
blame universities rather than industry for Britain’s economic woes rather
implausible.
By the 1980s research funding had reached a stage which John Ziman cap-
tured in the title of the report, Science in a « Steady State » (1987). The report
contrasted the sustained growth in science funding of preceding decades with
the levelling off of the 1980s, which he considered would continue. At the
same time the need for science showed no sign of levelling off, and the costs
of undertaking science were also on the rise. How could this situation be squa-
red? Industry and government implored academia to adopt more business-like
methods, which were partly pursued ; but to critics within academia this was
imposing on them the methods of a more dubious UK business system.
2.3.5. « Hidden innovation »
A series of reports emanating from NESTA (4) (2006, 2007, 2008) have
pointed out that « Historically, the UK has suffered from poor performance
relative to its major competitors on traditional measures of innovation »
(NESTA, 2007 : 4), for instance R&D per capita, but better once what it calls
measures of « hidden innovation » are taken into account. Sector-specific stu-
dies suggest the following indicators of such « hidden innovation » (inter alia) :
i) « Innovation that is identical or similar to activities that are measured by
traditional indicators, but which is excluded from measurement… »;
(4) The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts.
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ii) « Innovation without a major scientific and technological basis, such as
innovation in organisational forms or business methods… »;
iii) « Innovation created from the novel combination of existing technologies
and processes… »;
iv) « Locally-developed, small-scale innovations that take place « under the
radar’ » (ibid. : 5).
As these reports argue, the over-emphasis on traditional indicators has led to
a situation in which, « Consequently, policymakers have responded by incen-
tivising R&D, encouraging businesses to collaborate with universities and
substantially increasing public investment in scientific research » (ibid. : 4),
rather than promoting these sources flagged by due recognition of « hidden
innovation ». However the belief that the UK is particularly distinguished by
such hidden forms of innovation remains an article of faith.
2.4. Determinants of private-sector technological accumulation
The primary deficiency of the British economy in regard to its innovative
performance – at least so far as the technological dimension is concerned –
over the years from the 1960s to the 1990s thus arose in relation to the priva-
te sector of industrial business. It is there that one must begin the search for
sources of « failure », even if as already strongly implied the failure turns out
to be systemic at heart. Several candidates have proven popular in this respect.
2.4.1. Organizational/governance issues
The claimed weaknesses of British forms of industrial organisation, gover-
nance and management have been detected in a number of ways, apart from
allegations of sheer managerial incompetence that are hard to substantiate in
terms of any aggregate impact. Since this paper has laid some store on gover-
nance issues, a brief consideration should be given to some of the arguments
set out here.
a) Delayed introduction of the « M-form » (multi-divisional) corporate style
– this was the view put forward by the business historian Alfred Chandler (in
Chandler et al., 1999), that British firms clung too long to obsolete corporate
structures such as the « U-form » (unitary), which were too unfocused for an
era of multi-product companies selling their products to a variety of markets.
However, while this may be a valid criticism of UK corporations in the early
postwar years, in the days when large capital structures were dominant, the
product-oriented multi-divisional form itself became too rigid for the ensuing
years when companies came to be not just multi-product and multi-regional,
but multi-technology (Granstrand et al., 1997). More specifically, the M-form
could become a source of rigidity in a period when corporations were aiming
to develop ICT-based systems.
250 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°129-130, 1er et 2ème trimestres 2010
b) Short-termism through myopic decision-making systems (e.g. Patel and
Pavitt, 1988) – this argument holds that UK companies were particularly prone
to avoiding long-term strategic decisions such as those to invest in major new
technologies, under the pressure of powerful financial capital interests toge-
ther with voracious demands for dividends by their shareholders. Companies
such as the electrical equipment firm GEC (General Electric Company) pre-
ferred at times to accumulate monetary savings and place them in the stock
market rather than reorient themselves to the new era of ICTs.
c) The « market for corporate control » – such a market for corporate owner-
ship led to aggressive takeovers and asset-stripping, as exemplified by the
manoeuvres of wealthy industrialists such as Lord Hanson. In this case the
kind of market involved, so far from « failing », worked all too well.
2.4.2. Sectoral systems
The literature on sectoral systems of innovation has not yet been able to
demarcate clear boundaries for what it embraces by each sector – usually fal-
ling back on OECD definitions of « industries », which are an inconsistent
mixture of product-based and technology-based categories. Yet the work of
Malerba (2005) and colleagues has adduced the main drivers of such « sys-
tems », as summarised here under four sub-headings.
a) Opportunity : most concern has been expressed in this connection as rela-
ting to technological opportunities, of the kinds already outlined, though as
ICTs became general-purpose in nature they lost their sector-specific identi-
ties. Market opportunities would seem to be more applicable to the given
context of product-oriented sectors, and here the British situation was varied.
There seems to be some agreement in the literature that government ownership
and regulation of the National Health Service benefited the growth of the UK
pharmaceutical industry through its stability, whereas frequent changes indu-
ced by erratic governmental decision-making proved disruptive in some other
high-tech markets (like nuclear power). In geographical terms, British produ-
cers have been criticised for restricting their exports largely to safe Empire and
Commonwealth markets (e.g. Owen, date, for motor vehicles).
b) Appropriability : here the issues have tended to focus on patenting, or
rather the lack of it (as the statistics previously cited demonstrate), by many
British companies and other organisations. It is widely believed, for instance,
that British success in patenting of pharmaceuticals boosted financial support
for that industry. However it is conceivable that British companies were better
at developing « dynamic » modes of appropriability such as lead time, than at
« static » modes such as patenting.
c) Cumulativeness : in this aspect the issues focused on matters of size and
concentration. We have already observed how the 1960s and 70s witnessed a
quest for large corporations able to exert monopolistic muscle through beco-
ming « national champions ». This effort rather disintegrated thereafter as
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forces of globalization demanded the rise of « international champions », lea-
ving the old national monopolies stranded. Moreover, countervailing forces to
do with anxieties about innovation, employment, autonomy, etc., appeared to
warrant support for SMEs. Since the assessment by Kamien and Schwartz
(1982), analysts have learnt to distinguish between matters of size and matters
of concentration. Indeed, in the UK case, there is some evidence from admit-
tedly rather confused data suggesting that both small and large firms may be
best for innovation (e.g. Pavitt et al., 1987, based on the SPRU innovation
database for 1945-83), but medium levels of concentration could be best, to
avoid the contrasting inefficiencies of lack of power in fragmented industries
and lack of incentives in monopolistic industries.
d) Knowledge base : there were belated concerns about declining numbers in
STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering, mathematics), though
attempts to solve the problem through government intervention were either
inadequate – in the sense of having little visible impact – or excessive, as stu-
dents were lured into fields such as « computer studies » in the later 1990s and
early 2000s, only to find that the jobs to employ them were no longer present.
The sectoral data provided in von Tunzelmann (2003) support many of the
above findings, both positively and negatively. For the UK, the figures indica-
te a squeeze on R&D in high-tech sectors apart from pharmaceuticals – most
evident in sectors like aerospace (facing some withdrawal of protected home
markets as the government cut its defence budgets) and electronics (loss of
innovative competitiveness), despite the production shares of the UK holding
up in these sectors. The implication was one of a loss of power to foreign-
based MNCs that took over much of the UK production.
Even more significant is the fact that these figures overlook the rising share
of R&D in services, amounting to maybe as much as one-quarter of the total
by the later 1990s (Boden, 1998). The report from NESTA (2006) dwells on
the importance of many service sectors to the UK economy, and the compara-
tive unimportance of traditionally measured R&D in those sectors, though
even here some impact has become evident. Whether the UK success in finan-
cial services outlives the current financial crisis remains to be seen.
III. — THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
3.1. The early postwar period
Technology was envisaged by postwar governments as part of world advan-
cing at the macro level through combination of Keynesian rationalism, part-
nership with both industry and trade unions, and mass education (Buxton et
al., 1998). The counterpart at the meso level was investment in technological-
ly advanced manufacturing, and at the micro level of (static) economies of
scale. These, as already observed, were seen to be achieved through fostering
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large corporations, often with monopolistic control in the guise of the « natio-
nal champions ».
In fact no postwar government really succeeded in integrating all these com-
ponents with technology in systemic fashion. There was at best a half-hearted
attempt at the Ministry of Technology under Harold Wilson, but this ministry
was chronically underfunded and lacked adequate political clout. In practice,
attempts to forge any systemic response were outflanked by changing techno-
logical and economic paradigms (e.g. the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
agreements in the late 1960s, or the rise of MNCs under globalisation). As
macroeconomic policies appeared to fail, industrial policy came to be increa-
singly directed at supporting « lame duck » firms and industries, rather than
setting the technological basis for a different future.
3.2. The middle years
The new UK policy agenda for the 1980s tried to encourage deregulation,
privatization and « enterprise » – justified as representing « working with the
grain of market forces … [assisting firms] without weakening their commer-
cial responsibility for their own actions » (Barber and White, 1987 : 26), and
evidently preferable to working against the grain of market forces as in the
« lame ducks » strategies of the 1970s. This, however, led to policy « by
default », of letting market and corporate failures take their own course
towards destruction – contrasting sharply with the reality (though not the rhe-
toric) of US policy in the later 1980s (Branscomb and Keller, 1998).
Any government money for these purposes had to be justified on grounds of
« market failure » (the market sector would not do such things unaided),
« additionality » (government money could not simply replace private expen-
ditures), and especially of being « pre-commercialization » research. Thus,
according to a calculation by (Baroness) Margaret Sharp, industrial subsidies
were cut from about £20b in the late 1970s to just £0.5b by the late 90s (both
measured in 1996 prices) (cited in Barber and Georghiou, forthcoming : 2).
Technology policy reached something of an impasse, as the new collabora-
tive ventures set up even in the early 1980s were wound down, in a new vogue
for « enterprise » as well as for « rolling back the state ». In practice, what this
often meant was expanding the role for private-sector consultancy, funded if
need by the government, in lieu of leadership by the state. The most serious
case in point was the « Alvey programme » to support fledgling developments
in the UK’s ICT sector, which although being highly ranked in evaluations by
outside experts in its first phase (1983-87), also fell victim to the cuts and
diversions of public expenditures into the pockets of consultants thereafter.
More generally, the policy stances adopted in these years can be seen as
including the following :
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a) A shift from « mission » towards « diffusion » in the orientation of poli-
cies, to adopt the terminology of Ergas (1987), who had found the execution
of such mission orientation weaker in the UK than in other primarily mission-
focused countries like France or the USA.
b) Despite this a level of expenditure on military R&D that continued to be
high, still some 36 % of total GERD as late as 1997/8 despite the ending of the
« Cold War » at the start of the 1990s. Military R&D was characterised by its
resort to « baroque » technologies (Kaldor, 1982), increasingly limiting its
« dual-use » functionality for take-up by the civilian sector, e.g. in electronics.
c) The relentless privatization of nationalised industries cut R&D expendi-
tures, which tended to be regarded as « wasteful » from a short-term commer-
cial standpoint.
d) Regulatory issues were compounded by governance problems, for instan-
ce in response to rising public awareness of environmental concerns, moving
ahead of governmental action. Public support for science was shaken by a suc-
cession of scandals, especially in the area of food policy, where the role of the
existing ministry (MAFF, the Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food)
was coming to be seen as deeply ambiguous – MAFF was replaced by DEFRA
(the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs).
3.3. Policy design in later years
« Policy design » represents the ways in which multiple layers of systems are
individually and collectively structured and controlled to yield benefits – good
policy design is, in part, the expression of a satisfactory alignment process.
With this in mind, Freitas and von Tunzelmann (2008) test a three-dimensio-
nal model of public support design – vertical/horizontal knowledge objectives,
specific/general support provided, and local/central implementation – as a fra-
mework to characterise and compare national policy incentives. The paper
compares 149 policy programmes in the UK and France from the early 1980s
to 2002.
Despite the two countries having different national innovation systems, the
role of policy-making in both became increasingly recognised as a provider of
market incentives to new and/or better business-to-business services markets.
Both the French and the British public business supports became more non-
financial each time policy was redesigned, and increasingly concerned with
innovation. More specifically, until the mid-1990s, the French portfolio of
innovation policies concentrated more on the use of local support frameworks
and local services structures, while the British showed a greater reliance on
label creation (setting quality standards etc.) and central financial subsidies.
In the UK, the introduction of value-for-money and « hands-off policy exe-
cution » principles in the public sector delayed the process of decentralisation
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of public business support – before the mid-1990s most horizontal public sup-
port consisted of specific types of support centrally delivered, but from the
mid-90s a change can be observed towards more local implementation and the
provision of general support. It is also worth observing that, at least in our
dataset, most of the British programmes do not last for more than one sub-per-
iod – on the contrary, most of the French programmes launched in the first
(1980/88) and second (1989/94) sub-periods were still active in the final per-
iod (1999/2003). Whether this implies a lesser stability in British policy-
making or a greater willingness to take on new challenges (or both) must
remain for others to assess.
IV. — DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF INTERACTIVE AND DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES IN POLICY-MAKING
In complex structures such as national innovation systems, there is no a prio-
ri guarantee that the capabilities of one type of agent (say firms) evolve in the
same direction as those of another type of agent (say household consumers).
First, in accord with a classic market failure issue, asymmetries of information
may take them in different directions. But second, and more broadly, « asym-
metries of knowledge » may prevent them from going in the same directions,
even under the supposition that both parties are blessed with perfect informa-
tion.
Without going so far as to presume the existence of perfect information, the
significance of such asymmetries of knowledge is enough to propose that
interaction among the relevant types of agents may be necessary, whether ex
ante, through knowledge exchanges, or ex post, through market exchanges.
Thus a typical motor vehicle assembler engaged in contracting out the manu-
facture of individual components to its suppliers will usually begin with a
phase of knowledge interaction between them to settle details relating to the
parts in question, before purchasing those parts through market mechanisms –
the assembler will already have resolved the matter of quality control etc.
before paying for the items delivered.
Different agents (whether they are different firms or – say – different levels
of government) have differing capabilities for interaction – the ability to learn
from such interaction and to absorb the lessons, and then to « recycle » their
products into the system. In the case of governments, the « products » we are
concerned with are policies and their design. In the same manner as firms (and
universities), governments have differing competencies and dynamic capabili-
ties to react to and direct change, as exemplified by the crucial role of
« vision » in East Asian governments (von Tunzelmann et al., forthcoming).
The prevailing context of what Schumpeter (1934 : 64) called « dynamic
competition » means the environment (landscape) may be constantly chan-
ging. This entails interaction of the kinds hinted at above occurring in « real
time ». The extent to which the interactive capabilities of governments are
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« dynamic » is therefore dependent on the degree to which their policy sources
and/or impacts are not only novel but also appropriate to the changing envi-
ronments in which they are positioned. Formally speaking, government’s
dynamic interactive capabilities represent the extent to which the change in its
capabilities influences or is influenced by the change in the capabilities of
policy « suppliers » and users, all in real time.
Expressing such dynamic interactive capabilities in policy-making implies
the need to operate through demand as well as supply factors, including the
appropriate deployment of macroeconomic policy. In my paper in Revue 
d’Économie Industrielle I therefore argued that governments should move
towards a « Schumpeterian macroeconomics » (von Tunzelmann, 2004),
involving the active use of macro demand expansion to encourage demand-
pull innovation. I contended that in theoretical as well as practical terms this
would overcome the shackle of a vertical aggregate supply curve as argued by
monetarist economists.
To achieve this outcome implies in addition a need to enhance interactivity.
In recent times this has led policy-makers to advocate approaches that involve
support for « clusters » – a view promoted further by the influence of advisers
such as Michael Porter (Porter and Ketels, 2003). While these can help with
the interactive side of the coin, they can be a sometimes hindering element as
regards the pressure to act dynamically, since the notion of a cluster is inhe-
rently static. The dynamic counterpart of the cluster is indicated by the concept
of a « regional system of innovation », designed to promote interactivity for
change occurring in « real time ». Unfortunately the Regional Development
Agencies (RDAs) set up to divide the country with this in mind in 1999 have
lacked an adequate knowledge base for effective policy-making (Barber and
Georghiou, forthcoming).
The key issue comes back to a need to « align » the objectives of all types of
actors and agents. In other words, I am claiming that the underlying source of
policy inadequacy remains a matter of « network failure » through misalign-
ments. There is a need at governmental level to « align » the micro, meso and
macro levels, which may involve positive interactions between as well as
within local, regional, national and global systems of innovation. There is an
associated need – as the defensible but underwhelming resort to RDAs
shows – to inculcate policy capabilities to make the desired connections,
through « policy learning » (both internally within each government organiza-
tion, and externally through interacting with experts, evaluators, etc.).
V. — CONCLUSIONS
The UK White Paper of 1988 (Cmnd 278) ended most support for single-
company R&D and placed its emphasis on collaborative R&D, yet the under-
pinning economic analysis retreated deeper into the mystique of « market fai-
lure ».
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While it is sometimes possible to impute market-related costs to the funda-
mental shortcomings of policy-making noted in this paper, this does not mean
that providing a market would have resolved the problem identified. Often,
indeed, it might have exacerbated it, as with recent financial problems, or with
the « market for corporate control » (through encouraging myopic behaviour).
Instead, the paper sees the basic failings as being network failures in inade-
quate collaboration, and « inter-systemic » failures of breakdowns between
national « systems » of science, industrial innovation, finance, workplace
organization, etc. (von Tunzelmann, 2003) – in other words, alignment fai-
lures. These breakdowns in turn gave rise to a « blame culture » from mutual
misunderstandings, for example as between the « separate spheres » of finan-
ce and manufacturing industry. The resort to middlemen consultants did little,
in that such people were not trusted by SMEs (Barber and Georghiou, forth-
coming). Meanwhile, the rather incongruous adherence to the « linear model »
involved a reliance on academic spin-offs for generating new technologies and
also their diffusion. The split of the old DTI into the newly created depart-
ments called DIUS (for science and long-term technology development) and
BERR (for business innovation) in 2007, if anything, looks likely to perpetua-
te the inter-systemic failures that have characterised British technological
development for over a century.
In this paper I have thus argued firstly that an analysis of technology trends
indicates that non-market failures, mainly systemic and dynamic in nature,
were a more basic source of British technological shortcomings than market
failures. Secondly, an analysis of trends in UK technology policy has sugges-
ted that narrowly economics-based views too often hampered good intentions
to reform policy along more appropriate lines, and restricted development of
any serious capabilities for « policy learning » in relation to innovation by UK
governments both national and regional. While no country probably gets all
the relevant networks fully aligned to achieve optimal output, the argument
here is that the UK could gain from adopting « better practice » approaches to
improve its innovative performance.
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